62 Paradigms and Sand Castles

the likelihood of regime survival, if the predatory group is rela-
tively small. Hoarding by the leader's faction is thus likely. If the
hoarding is not too extreme, as in figure 2.3, the rival faction is
better off continuing to cooperate, and most of the time that is
what they do.
If the rival faction withdraws its support and begins to plot the
leader's overthrow, its members risk life, liberty, and property.
The rewards of a successful overthrow are high, but so are the
costs of detection, betrayal, or defeat. In the game, the uncer-
tainty over the outcome of plots is shown as a play by Nature.
The plot succeeds with probability p, usually a low number, and
fails with probability I - p. The rival faction decides whether to
continue its support for the leader's faction by comparing its
payoff for support with its expected payoff from a plot. Two
considerations thus affect the choice: the benefits being derived
from the status quo and the potential plotters' assessment of the
risk of plotting. As long as the personalist ruler seems powerful
enough to detect plots and defeat coup attempts, the rival faction
will continue to cooperate if it gets some benefits from the re-
gime. The leader's faction has an incentive to reduce the benefits
to the rival faction to a level just above that needed to prevent
plotting. This system is very stable as long as the ruler can distrib-
ute the minimum level of benefits needed to deter plotting and
can maintain control over an effective security apparatus and
loyal military. The situations in which these conditions become
less likely are discussed below.
By drawing on some rudimentary game theory, I have begun
to develop insights into how the interests of cadres in different
kinds of authoritarian regimes might play out in different con-
texts and how resilient to stress the cadres' loyalties to regime
leaders might be. These insights motivate the analysis in the next
section.
The Consequences of Differences in Interests
The interests described above provide a starting point for figur-
ing out whether the splits and rivalries that exist within all kinds
of governments will lead to regime breakdown. Because most
military officers view their interests as following a logic similar to
that of a battle-of-the-sexes game, they acquiesce in continued
intervention regardless of whether military rule becomes institu-
tionalized, the leader concentrates power in his own hands, or a