506 National Banks—English and American. [December,

treasury, under a vote of credit, which accompanies the parlia ment grant of supplies for the year; they go out in anticipation of the revenue, and are secured upon the receipt of the same, with a further provision that they shall be received in payment of taxes and all other government dues. The occasions on which these are issued by the treasury are, 1. The ordinary case of deficiency in some expected source of revenue; these form what are termed “deficiency bills”—and constitute, as stated in evidence, “the usual applications.” 2. When, from the state of the money market, or the discredit of government, exchequer bills fall to par, or near it. On such oc casions, an instance of which occurred in August and September, 1825, when they fell to ninety, the government call upon the bank to go forward and become a purchaser of exchequer bills, already issued, taking them out of the market, and thus raising their price, that they may not be paid in as revenue, which, at par, they unquestionably would be, and thus cause a loss of revenue to an equivalent amount. 3. Upon any financial opera tion of the government, which requires the anticipation of funds. As an instance, we may take the one so grievously complained of, and known under the expressive appellation of “the dead weight,”—forming what Mr. A. Baring as appropriately termed “ the choke” of the bank. This consisted in the assumption by the bank, in the year 1823, of the payment of all the naval and military provisions, superannuated allowances, &c., with which a war of twenty-five years had saddled the government; amounting, at the time of the bargain, to above five million pounds a year. These annuities, the bank, at the solicitation of government, un dertook to pay, for an annuity of five hundred and fifty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty pounds, for forty-four years, the sum estimated to be advanced in five years being an amount rising thirteen millions of pounds. This bargain, it was stated in evidence, was “bad alike for the country and the bank;” but whether loss or gain followed such a financial operation, it was unquestionably ruinous to the reputation of the bank as a regula tor of the currency. The effect of such issues on the safety of the bank and the equi librium of the currency is evident. “Was it not asking from the bank (inquired the committee in relation to the case of 1825) a measure inconsistent with its own security ?” ..?ns. “It certainly was not a desirable measure.”—(Harman, 2207.) But the bank or government must suffer, and in such an emergency there was but one choice. Upon the currency the effect is still less ambigu ous. Every purchase of exchequer bills by the bank, whether from the government, or out of the stock market, leads to the emission of an equivalent amount of notes, most probably swell ing the currency beyond the needs of commerce, and at any rate,